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EVALUATION OF PRICE CONTROL AND
PRICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AT WORK
mum profit should be is a

INTRODUCTION

tive issue and its

varies from one firm

Since 1970 Nigerian Government has used a number of measures in its attempt to moderate the

of inflation in the country.
of these measures is the direct
regulation of prices of selected
commodities. To give effect to this
regulation (otherwise called price
control) the Federal Government
promulgated a decree - the price
control decree 1970. This decree
listed twenty-three categories of
commodities for which the government, through the Price Control
Board, determines the prices. The
operation of the price control, as
set out by'the 1970 decree, had
rate

decree No. 1 of 1977. Eoth
versions of the price control decree
provide for a Price Control Board
at the centre and Price Control
Committees in each state of the
Federation. The Pric0 Control
Board is charged with the task of

trol

fixing the prices of selected commodities and of supervising its
officials and agents in the task of
price enforcement. The Price Control Committees are set uP to en-

force price control at the state
level and to assist the Eloard generally. ln 1975. an Anti-lnf lation
Task Force which was set up by

the Federal

Government, recom-

mended the establishment of Price

lntelligence Agency. The government accepted the recommendation
and subsequently set up the Agency
which is charged with the task of

studying and interpreting Price
movements on a continuing basis
and of carrying out other duties
that may be assigned to it from
time to time.

duction or distribution hence, average cost, which is the yardstick for
measuring "equity price", contains
normal profit, However, as the

normal profit cannot be exactly
defined, this yardstick can - be
looked at as an incomplete guide in

determining

played by Price lntelligence Agency
in this regard with a view to offering suggestions for improvement.

ln order to carry out this assessment, the remaining part of this
paper is divided into three sections
thus: (i) a brief survey of the concept of price control; (ii) operation
of price control in Nigeria and (iii)
assessment and suggestions for improvement.

the level at

vvhich

to.control price.

The second question

to

be

exarnined in this theoretical apprai-
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A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CON.
CEPT OF PRICE CONTROL
ln order to assess the effectiveness of price control in Nigeria it is
necessary to examine the theoreti-

it. Price control is
when the price determined by the inter play of supply

cal basis for
resorted

to

sal is to find out how effective
price control is as a system of
determining prices. Many economists are not optimistic about the
result of price control. Those who
favour price control at all qualify
it wlth many "ifs" that are difficult
to realise. The economist's idea
about the result of price control
is clearly illustrated by the following prddiction of economic theory:

and demand is considered too high

or too low. ln the former case the
price fixing authority uses a maximum price in order to , protect
buyers from exhorbitant prices
while in the latter it fixes a minimum price in order to encourage
producers and sellers. This paper,
hovwver, focusses attention on
maximum price regulation. hence
the term in-price control - in this
paper refers to it.

This theoretical survey is
meant to answer two main ques-

tions. The first one is: What deter'
mines the level at which price is
controlled? Equity is usually the

criterion for determining the

This paper attempts to assess
the effectiveness of this price reguiation in the country and the part

to another,

Ccinventionally, normal profit is
regarded as part of the cost of pro-

One

been amended several times before
it was replaced with the price con-

sublec-

interp!'etation

level

at which price is controlled. Equity price is taken to be fair to both
the seller and the buyer because at
that price the seller earns only
normal profit while the buYer
allows just that. But normal profit
is not easy to specify. According to
J.L. Hanson normal profit is "the
amount of profit required to keep
an entrepreneur in a particular line
of production". lt is the minimum
profit which an entrepreneur is prepared to accept for parting with his
commodities but what this mini'

"The setting up of maximum

will cause a shortage of
the commodity and reduce...
the quantity actually bought
prices

and sold...."

Before we can examine this prediction it may be necessary to find
out the reason for fixing a maxi-

mum price at all. We should realise

that if competition exists in its
pure form in any economY there
will be no need for maximum price
regulation which seeks to f ix
prices at the equitable level (usually
where only normal profit is made).
This is because under pure competi'
tion the existence of suPernormal

profit

(usually accompanied by
high prices) will attract new firms.
The entry of new firms will then
increase the industry's supply and
thereby compete away the suPer'

normal profit of the existing firms.
This means that each firm will be

only normal profit and
the need to reduce price by
price control will be removed. But
under pure monopoly, oligopoly
or monopolistic competition the

earning
hence

imperfections of the market
13

structurerwill not allow the

normal profit

to be

super-

competed
away. Hourcver, neither pure competition nor pure monopoly exist

in real life.

What we have

are

various forms of oligopoly (mainly
at malor manufacturing level) and

monopolistic competition (at the
level of retail and service opera-

tions).

lt

is the resultant high prices

occasioned

by the

imperfections
of these market structures that
make the government attempt
artificial price regulation which
we call price control. lf we realise

therefore, that the reason lor
fixing a maximum price is that the
one determined by the price system

is

considered

too high, then

control assuming that the commo-

do not

have exceptional
demand. On the other hand producers and sellers who had been
making super normal profit at the
pre-control prices may find themselves making only normal profit
or even losses at the controlled
prices depending on the costing
system of the price fixing authority. Losses or even reduced profit
is likely to discourage at least some
of the sellers from supplying the
usual quantities of their commodities at the controlled prices. lf the
quantity supplied at the controlled
prices falls, the quantity actually
bought is correspondingly reduced
and excess demand piles up, hence
the prediction mentioned above is
logical. lf excess demand exists,
the price control authority is faced
with two major problems - how to
keep price at the controlled level

and at the same time ensure an
orderly distribution (or rationing)

of the scarce commodities among
increased number of buyers or even
the same number of buyers with en-

hanced demand. lf price enforcement is not effective, sellers can
still sell above the control Price
openly and escape punishment but
when it becomes very difficult to
sell above the control price openly

without being caught some of the

commodities are likely to disappear
into the black-market where they
are sold at prices higher than the
control level. This view is reflected

in

another prediction

by

Richard

G. Lipsey thus:

"The potential for a profi'
table black market will always exist
whenever effective price ceiling is
imposed".
14

that the black market succeeds in
raising prices and a success to the
extent to which transactions take
place at the controlled prices".
Another economist - Kenneth E.
Boulding has noted that some
factors can prevent the failure of
price control - namely the control
of production and consumption by
price control authority and keeping

GROUP

B

MATE. - RBUILDING
IALS

(i)Cement

(ii) Roofing materials
(iii) Building materials (miscellaneous)

GROUPC_HOUSEHOLDNEC_
ESSITIES

(i) Salt

(ii) Flour
(iii) Mitk
(iv) Sugar
.(v) Matches

the controlled price close to the
free market price. This is clearly
brought out by this passage from
his book - Economic Analysis:

(vi) Tirrned meat
(vii) Tinned fish
(viii) Textiles and clothing

".-.....any attempt to fix a price by
authority without control of either

Motor cycles & spare parts
(iii) Bicycles & spare parts

production

or

consumption

is

doomed to failure, unless, of coursg
the price fixed happens to be close
to the price which could have been

established

in the

unregulated

D VEHICLES AND
ELECTRONICS
Motor vehicles & spare parts

GROUP

(i)

we

should expect the controlled price
to be lower than the free market
price. With lower price new consu!'ners are expected in the controlled
market while old ones may increase
their demand because of the purchasing power released by the price

dities

According to him (Richard G.
Lipsey) the policy of keeping prices
down is "a failure to the extent

lii)

(iv) Tyres and inner tubes
(v) Electronics
GROUP E _ DRINKS

(i) Beer and stout
(ii) Soft drinks

F _ EDUCATIONAL
MATERIALS & MEDICINE

GROUP

market".

This is the view of many economists and was partially shared by
H.T. Koplin who declared in his
book - Micro Economic Analysis,
th us:

(i) Educational materials
(ii ) Pharmaceuticals

GROUP G
Tobacco

It may be necessary at this stage

"ln fact, to be effective, price
control almost always must be

supplemented with regulation of
output (for example rationing)".

The validity or otherwise of
these assertions

with

respect to

Nigeria can be discovered by examination of the working of price control in Nigeria.

OPERATION OF PRICE CONT_
ROL IN NIGERIA
The Price Control Board, assisted by the State Price Control
Committees, is the authority entrusted with the task of fixing the
prices of selected commodities in
Nigeria and ensuring that the prices
are observed ln order to carry out
these functions, the Price Control
Board makes use of economists,
accountants, and statisticians for

price fixing and price inspectors

by the police) for price
enforcement while the law courts
(assisted

determine cases that inevitably arise

in the task of controlling prices.
According to the current price

control decree. the number of categories of controlled commodities
has been increased to twenty-five.
These commodities can be regrouped into seven thus:

GROUPA_PETROLEUMPRO-

(i) Petrol

DUCTS

(iii)

Diesel oil

(ii) Kerosine (iv) Fuel oil

to examine the following aspects
of Nigeria's Price Control experience in respect of the commodities
mentioned above: (a) Price deter-

mination, (b) Price enforcement,
(c) Punishment for Price Control
offences, (d) Price Control and

Price lntelligence Agency,
(e) Effect of Price Control on
inflation in Nigeria, (f) Relevance
of economic theory to Nigerian
experience in price control.
(a)

PRICE DETERMINATION

The pricing system of the
Price Control Board has been
amended several times since its
inception. ln its present form it
involves the fixing of a basic price
and then adding to it a permitted
variation in order to get the controlled prices. The basic price
represents "the cost of production

plus manufacturers' profit" for
Iocaily produced commodities

and

"the duty-paid landed cost

in

Nigeria plus the importers' profit"

for imported

goods. The permitted
variation includes the transport cost
and other approved cost plus the

distributors' profit. , ln practice,
what the Price Control Board
(through its experts) does in the

case of controlled locally produced
commodities is to study the cost

structure

of the f irms producing

it to get
the cost per lrnit of the cornrn(}

them. This study enables

dities, To this unit cct is added the
manufacturers' profit wtrich is also
deermined by the Board. Then the
cost and reward of distribution are
fixed (and added to the manufacturerc' unit cost and profit) in order
to get the controlled prices at
various levels of distribution. ln a

similar way the Board determines
the importers profit as rrtcll as the
cost and reward of distributing

imported commodities.
One of the major obstacles in

this exercise is that the Price Control Board has not got adequate
manpov\rer. Apart from the Chairman, the Executive Secretpry, a
Senior Assistant Secretary, an Assi.

stant Secretary and some parttime members, the Price Control
Board and the newly affiliated Price

lntelligence Agenry had only seven
price study and price fixing experts

the market. Therefore, the reliance

on the Price -Control

"determined .cott" in fixing prices

profit The price fixing autho.
rity arrives at the profit or mark.
up by a subjective estimation of
wfiat is "fair" but wtrat is fair from
the price fixers' point of view may
up or

be vierrtred differently by producers,

importers and distributors whose
primary oblective is to side-track
the controlled pricqs.
(b) PRlCE ENFORCEMENT:

ln

of the relucr

anticipation

tance of producerc, importers and
distributors to observe price regu-

lation, the 1977 Price Control
Decree stipulates, among other

things, that:

(i)

the Executive Secretary to the

controlled commodities

price inspector.

require separate prices, this level of
man-pourer does not permit the
price fixing experts to undertake
a detailed examination and assessment of the books and documents

on wtrich depends the

prices
which the Price Control Board
fixes. But increase in man-pourcr
will not solve all the problerns connected with price fixing. The manufasturers and distributo6 create
another problem by not co-operat
ing with the price fixing experts
who examine their books and
documents. lt appearc that in order
to get at the root of the cost strusture of our firms the Price Con-

trol

Board should maintain a large
team of experts wtro will not only
have statutory po\^/er to inspect the
books of various firms but also will

maintain foreign correspondents
who will monitor the prices or cost
of the imported raw materials used
by our firms and the imported

finished goods whictr

it

vue

consume.

should be realised that
no matter how accurate the cost
structure study is, it is supply and
Hovrever,

demand and not cost that determine the ,r,,T::t goods already in
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Trade may appgint public officers
as inspectors

(iii)

foi price enforcement.

every secretary to the local
government shall be ex-office a
(iv) every price inspector shall be
under the control of the State

Price Controller wtro in turn

shall be responsible

Price Controller.
(v) the price inspectors are autho-

rised not only

qo

sdo
rg

to

inspect the busi-

ness premises of manufacturers,
wholesalers and retailers but also

to

examine any books, accounts,
and documents relating to their

and to request for
relevant information from them
and also to conduct on behalf of
the Price Control Board any civil
businesses

or criminal

proceedings arising

under the decree.

(vi) ttre price control decree does
not prevent the police or any legal
practitioner from conducting on
behalf of the Price Control Board
any civil or criminal proceedings.
To a large extent the provisions

of this decreer is similar to Seetion
5 of the 1970 Price Control Decree
which has been repealed. lloweyer,
the current decree has made provi-

sion for more price
by

inspectors
making the secretaries of local

govemments ex-officio price inspectorc but it is not as explicit as

t971

amendment

dectee on the part

the police in
6l

to the Chief

to the

1970

to be played by
price enforcement.

According to this amendment,
"a police officer, as well as price

Control inspestor, may arrest with-

out warrant any pe6on contrave
ning the provisions of this decree
and vufien arrested by an inspestor,

2

tEffi
Adt

M

made as will be discussed later
in this paper. A third obstacle
arises wfiile determining the mark-

price Control Board shall have
the duty to supervise the enforcement of the Orders of the Board.
(ii) the Federal Commissioner for

which

rwllE
lrl

can be misleading. A better use of.
the cost structure study should be

comprising one eoonomist, three
aocountants and three statisticians
by July 1976 (see Table 1). This
number increased to eight by April
1977 with the employment of one
more statistician, showing a rise
of only 14.3 per cent. ln view of

the large number of brands of the
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the inspector shall hand over tre
arrested person as soon as possible
to the police". But the current

decree eimpl! states that the price
control decree does not prevent
the police from conducting on
behalf of the price control Board
any civil or criminal proceedings
arising under the decree. Despite
this loophole the current decree has
proi,ided the price control Board
with usefu! weapons to enforce
the prices it has fixed. In practice,
hourcver, there are some bottlenecks rfulrich lead to failure in this
exercise.

The first bottleneck appears at
first sight tobe insufficient number
of price control inspectors. As at
first January, 1976 there were only
284 full-time inspectors in the
whole country. This number increa
sed by 6.3 per cent to 302 by

April, 1977 (See Tabe 2).
secretaries

of

The

local governments

who are now made ex-officio price
inspectors are too committed to

other responsibilities to be of
much use

in price enforcement.

The po.lice wlro are expected to be
active price inspectors hardly take
the initiative 'in arresting price

control offenders and

instead

content themselves with the prosecution of offenderc already caught

by the full-time price inspectors.
Hovrcver, a critical look at the
number of price control inspectors
and their efforts can show that
numerical strength is not the real
problem. The real bottleneck is lack

of dedication by the price control
inspectors who have been unable to
arrest more price offenders despite
the fact that price control offences
are widespread. For example, if thg
number of full-time price'inspectors
was reduced to only 2(X) between
lst January and 3(hh June, 1977

if each inspector was able to
arrest one price offender each
week the total airests during the
period would have been 5,2q)
instead of only 2,991 arr.ests wtrich
2U - 302 inspectors achieved
during the period (See tabte 4).
The ingenuity of producers, distributors and retailers in circumventing price regulation has also
weakened the role of price control
inspectors. Another bottleneck is
the existence of many 'grades' of
retailers. The problem stems from
and
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the fact that the price control

mercial vehicles. The use of manhours means that whether the servicing charge per man-hour is high
or low the companies have still the
power to get out of the customer as

mucfr money as they want to

agents difficult and sometimes
makes them sympathise with the

small retailers whose commodities
are bought at prices above the
controlled levels. Besides, the prices

are often inflated by the wholesalers and major distributors who
pass them on to the retailers,

thereby complicating price enforcement at the retail level. Many consumers, realising the predicament of
the small retailers, tend to sympa

thise with them, hence the buyers
who are supposed to aid price
inspectors, by reporting the price
offenders, hardly do so.
Producers, importers and dis-

tributors, relying on these w€aknesses of price enforcement, devise
ways of charging exhorbitant prices
for their commodities either by
observing the law superficially or
taking cover in the black market.
One of these devices is the manipulation of servicing or maintenane charges for durable goods in

order to make up any loss (real or
imaginary) from the sale of goods
at the controlled prices ln our
survey of motor companies (between July and October, 1977) ten

of our respondent companies stated
their vehicle servicing charges per
man-hour wtrile two indicated that
they do not charge per man-hour.
Two others did not give any information on services charges. Of
those companies wtrich had Crown

their service charges per man-hour
the range of increase betrryeen 1970
and 1976 was from 33.3 to 486.7
per cent (see Table 3). lnvestigations reveal that the charges indicated are mainly for srnall and
medium size cars. Higher rates
are used for bigger cars and com16

CONTROL OFFENCES:
a deterrent
from breaking of the price regula
tion, the Price Control Decree has
made provision for different forms
of punishment to match the various
offences connected with price regu-

hardly

lation (see Table 5). The offences
include selling above the control

report them and therefore they feel
they have a good chance of'hoard-

price, hoarding, contravening resale

ing without being

arrested. -The
aiirs of hoarding iiclude the.iricreasing of scarcity and thereby holding both the price fixing autfiority

price maintenance agreement, refusal to give the required information
to the price control authority and
its agents or giving false informa-

consumers to ransom and
consequently forcing the price

and

authority

to

review

tion, and

the

prices
upwards or compelling the consumers to patronise the black market wtrich is fed by the hoarded

commodities. As a rssult of the
defests of price control enforcement, already mentioned, very few

of the hoarders, are usually taken
to court. For example, between

January and June 1977, only 297

of hoarding were recorded by

cases

the Price Control Board

PUNISHMENT FOR PRICE
ln order to provide

replace old ones. Another
to beat price control is hoarding of the controlled commodities. The hoarders know that there
are few price control inspectors

and that the consumers

make profit at all. Sometimes there
are even more than two grades of
retailers. This development makes
that work of price enforcement

modation and food.

(c)

to

retarters from vufiom the consumerc
These big
retailers sell either at the controlled
prices or a little more to the small
retailers wfig have no alternative

the control price if they are to

reserve beer for their lodgers wtro
pay exhorbitantly for the accom-

stay with them, especially in respest of vehicles that are not easily
serviced outside the motor companies. ln many cases the companies also supply the new parts
device

than to sell the commodities above

cational materials trade) and compelling consumers to buy commodities that are more profitable to
the sellers as a condition for selling
the controlled commodities with
less profit as found in hotels which

charge them because they determine how many hours the vehicles

Board fixes one retail price for a
commodity, when in practice, there
are big retailers who sell to stnall

buy what they want.

found in pharmaceuticals and edu-

(See

Table 4). reprsenting 9.9 per cent
of total arrests for all price control
offences. These recorded cases of
hoarding can be looked at as scape
goats of what has become common-

place. Other methods of 'sidetracking the price control include
inflating delivery charges of goods,
rerroving the standard accessories
of goods (life radios in motor
vehicles) and still selling them at
controlled prices or even more;
exploiting the ignorance of customers especially in respect of the
controlled commodities wttich have
nurrprous brands and models (as

repeated price control offences.
The fines range from two hundred
naira (200.00) to ten thousand

naira (N10,000.00) while the terms
of imprisonment range from six
months to over three years, increasing in severity from retailers to
manufacturerc. Besides, the courts
reserve the right to senten@ an
offender to both fine and imprisonment depending on the nature
of the offence.
The punishments are admitte-

dly

severe enough to serve as deterrents to price control offenders
but the inadequacy of price enforcement already mentioned makes it
difficult for most of the offenders
to be caught at all. Besides, a small
proportion of the few arrests are

usually convicted. For example, the
record of the Price Control Board

for

arrests and convictions from

January'to June, 1977, show that
only 28.0 per cent of arrests in the
(5q
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whole country t/vere convicted (See
Table 4). ln Lagos, Kaduna, Oyo
and Ondo States only 3.9 per cent,

4.9 per cent, 5.2 per cent, and
7.7 per cent, respectively, of
arrested offenders, were convicted.
This wide gap between arrests and

convistions may be attributed to
either the technicalities of the law

or to

the

movements (including Resale Price
Maintenance) on a Qontinuing basis.

(d) PRICE INTELLIGENCE AGE.
NCY AND PRICE CONTROL

As has been mentioned at the

The Agency is located in the
Ministrv of Trade with the aim of
reblacing the Price Control Board
which is to be phased out. Even
though this Agency is part of the
Productivity, Price and lncomes
Board, it can hardly be distinguished from the Price Control
Board in practicr. They share a

'common Chairman and Secretary
as vvell as other officers who regard
themselves as working for both
bodies. What has happened is that
establishment of the Price
lntelligence Agency has strengthe-

the

ned the research and Price deter-

mination unit of the Price Control
Board.

t_-

"studying and interpreting price

of the prosecuting agents.

ommissions and commi-

BOARD

a

operational arms of this Board and
is charged with the functions of

(e) EFFECTS OF PRICE CONTROL ON NIGERIAN INFLA.

ssions

T

1977, promulgated a decree setting

it up formally. Price lntelligence
Agency (also recommended by the
Task Forcg) is one of the four

At the height of the inflation
in Nigeria in 1975, the Federal

Government, in search of solution,
appointed an Anti-lnflation Task
Force to review inflationary trends
in the country in all its ramifications with a view to recommending
a workable solution. The Task

Force recommended, among other

things the setting up of a new board
to be called Productivity, Price and

to make contribumanagement of the

lncomes Board

tion to the

economy. The Federal Government
accepted this recommendation and
set up the Board and later in April,

TION
begihning of this paper, price control is one of the measures designed
to fight the high rate of inflation
in the country. The effect of price
control on inflation is not easy to,
measure because any observed dece-

leration

of inflation

credited only
also

cannot

to price control

be

defects, the Lagos Consumer Retai

Price lndex is still useful. Let

Retil Price lndex (Middle lncome) (see tables 7 & 8l lrom the 3rd
quarter of 1975 to the lst quarter

ol

1977. For controlled commodities in the selestion the indices
of 50.0 per cent of the commodities showed deceleration from the
3rd quarter of 1975 to the 3rd

quart6r of 1976 (i.e. in Period A)
while in the same period only 33.3
per oent of the uncontrolled commodities showed evidence of deceleration. ln period B (i.e. betrrrleen
the 4th quarter of 1975 to the 4th
quarter of 1976) the indices of 33.3

but

to other useful measures that

are employed simultaneously with
combat inflation and there is
no way of isolating other measures
and allowing one to work in order

qEulg) f_o! a.
LAq-!_E_._q

U:

:.

l1l

commodities and uncontrolled ones
may throw some light on the

inflation in the country.
The first problem that arises
here is that the composite consumer price index wtrich covers the

relevant years cannot be used
because it groups controlled and
uncontrolled commodities under
the same heading, for example
"food". The second problem is
Lagos Consumer Price

as good as the
Composite Consumer Price lndex in

vant years and is not

measuring inflation. Despite these
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price control on the

lndex which v\re are left to use
because it has a good list of controlled and uncontrolled commodities does not cover all the rele-

s_ol{E

t9r6

'i ':

price index for some controlled

that the

r!

2

to measure its impact. However,
a comparison of the consumer
of
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impact

us

now compare selected controlled
and uncontrolled commodities as
shovrrn in the Lagos Consumer
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the companies were asked to
estimate their demand for the
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per cent of the controlled commo-

dities decelerated as against 25.fi)
per ceht of the uncontrolled commodities. From the first quarter
of 1976 to the 1st quarter ol 1977
(i.e. Period C) the indices of 75.0
per cent of the controlled commo-

dities decelerated compared with
the deceleration of 25.0 per cent of
the controlled ones. Of the commodities wtrose indices rose during the
periods mentioned above the range
of rise for controlled commodities
is from 0.6 per cent to 18.5 per
cent for period A; 1.0 per cent to
44.1 per cent for Period B; and

0.8 per cent to 5.1 per cent for
Period C. But for uncontrolled
commoditiris the range of rise is
from 5.7 to 59.5 per cent for
period A while Periods B & Cshow
the range or rise to be 3.0 per cent
to 70.4 per oent and 0.5 to 46.3
per cent respectively. The evidenoe
before us has, thus, shown that
controlled commodities have con-

tributed. more than the uncontrolled ones in reducing the rate of
inflation while the uncontrolled
commodities have contributed
more in aggrevating the rate of
inflation at least within the period
covered by this analysis. The validity of this conclusion is somehow

by the fact that the
of price control

imperfections

(already mentioned) may even dis-

tort to some extent, the consumer
Price Surveys. These surveys are
carried out in the open market and

not in the black

!53.4
95.7

!6.8

lB.3

market where

many of the controlled commodities are sold at exhorbitant prices.
Besideq we have used the Lagos
consumer retail prices indices for
the middle income group instead of
the more representative composite
consumer price index for Lovner
lncome group. Therefore this analysis has not provided a conclusive
evidence to show wtrether uncontrolled commodities contribute
more than controlled ones in increasing the rate oi inflation in the
country. However, one thing has

been established - i.e. both the
controlled and uncontrolled com-
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to be represented by sales for those
years when there was 'Pxi'dss
demand" but for the years wfien
"excess supply" existed, it is the
"sales" plus "the stock at the end
of the year" that represent supply.
But stock figures are not available,
hence the supply figures are adequate only for the years when
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(F}

ECONOMIC THEORY AND
IIGERIAN EXPEBIENCE iN

of

PRICE CONTROL
Having examined the working
price control in Nigeria, it may

be necessary

to find out

excess demand existed. The result
of this paucity of data is that the
returns of the motor companies
are useful only for two years - 1975
and 1976 wfien all the respondent
companies (except one) recorded

vufiether

emnomic theory has been relevant
in understanding it. One of the predictions of Economic theory is that
price control creates shortage and

reduces

the quantity

excess demand. Analysis of the
returns has produced the following

actually

bought and sold. The ob,served scarcity in the economy is attributed to
a number of factors (inch.tding price

panies vvere asked

to

6) - tne
for cars below 2000cc

information lsee table

figures are

except where otherwise stated:
(i) Out of the fourteen respondent
companies only two companies
C & D recorded sufficient stock up
to 1975 while only Company C,

control). ln order to find out the
extent of this scarcity in motor
trade and to find out the contribution of price control to it, a
survey of motor companies was
conducted between July and
October, 1977. The motor com-

which distributes locally assembled
cars had sufficient stocks up to
1

give, among

976.

(ii) All the other respondent companies admitted getting excess

other thingi, information on their
car sales on yearly basis from 1970

demand since 1975 but three companies (1, L & M) refused to estimate the demand for their cars for

to

1976 as well as the yearly
demand for their cars during the
same period. The demand is to be
ascertained by showing figures for
bookings for cars and then adding
to it applications for bookings
rejected because the expected cars
would not be enough;.. Booking is
defined here as requests to buy cars
backed by part or full payment or
a firm promise to pay. The first
problem that arises in getting the
figures for demand is that most of
the companies are unable to
produce figures for bookings. The
second problem is that all the
companies, with the exception of
one, do not keep records of requests for bookings that were
rejected. As a result of these problems created by absence of data,

1975 while companies L a M
failed also to estimate it for 1976.
From the available data exoess

demand ranged from one for Company A to 2,527 for Company G in
1975. ln 1976 half of the respondent companies had exces demand
ranging from 210 to 1,917 while
companies F, l, N & G had excess

demand

of

4,500, 4,517, 4,982

and 6,107 respectively. From 1975
to 1976, excess demand increased
in all the companies that gave the
releyant data with the exception
of Company E where it fell by 4.2
per cent. The fall in excess demand
in company E was not caused .by
fall in demand but rather by incre-

LAGOS CONSUMEB FETAIL PAICE INDICES (MIOOLE INCOME) FOF SELECTEO
COMMOOITIES (WITHOUT PFICE C@TROL)
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modities have contributed to inflation.
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on yearly basis. But the
figures got by this estimate might
have been adversely affected by
multiple bookings by some anxious
buyers wfto want to buy from the
oompany that can supply the cars
first. On the other hand supply is
period
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/
as in supply resulting from the
distribution of locally assembled

ble black market by creating or
encouraging scarcity when the price

authority enforces

a

cars by the company. The rise in
exces demand, from 1975 to 1976,
ranges from 61.0 per cent for
Company H througNt 682.5 per
cent for Company B to 2O990.1
per cent {or CompanV A. The

ted cannot be stated

restristaon

because black marketeers operate in

on the importation of
cars as rmll as the increased liquidity 8nd purdrcing poranr in the
eoonomy had contributed much to

this scrcity. Price Control uvhich
hc kept car prices fairly at low
levels aggrarrated the situation by
making it posible for more people
to demand cars and by encouraging
hoarding (for example, since 1975
the Prica Control Board has sealed
up to six Inotor cdnpanies in Lagos
area for hoarding). lt is mainly for
the Eame roasons that this scarcity
continues till today but the contribution of prie control to the
trend cannot be quantified because

other factors are contributing to

this scarcity simultaneously with

price control. The fast that some
motor companies have been sealed
up for hoardlng some vehicles
(induding cars) shows that the
quantity rupplied of these vehicles

had been withheld during the
period of hoarding As people can-

not buy wfiat is not supplied it

is

reasonaue to say that price control,

by reducing the quantity actually

sold at

tre controlled prica auto

matically reduced the quantity
astually bought

Another predistion of Economlc theory that should be related
to Nlgerian experience is that price
oontrol clostes $e potential for a
prqfitable black market To explore

the contontlon rte should firct
ostablash the fastors drat cregte this

potontial and then find out whether
these fastors exist in Nigeria. The

first fastor is the

existence of

"excess demand" wtrile the second
one is the existence of price enfor-

is not matched by
effestive rationing of the available
commodities. The survey of motor
oement' wtrich

companies (already mentiongd) has
revealed thc existcnce of the first
fastor -''excess demand or scarcitY

qr trade in 1975 and
1976. The same trend continues
today and is exPerienced in other
commodities. The second fastor
in motor

also exists. The record of arrests
and convictions of price control
offenders (see Table 4) shorrrs .that
there have been attempts to enforce

the price control. Despite the
existence of this enforcement,
rationing of controlled commodities

are largely left in the hands of

the producsrs and distributors wtto
exploit the situation to suit their
profit motine. Thus, price control
creates the potential for a profita-

maximum

price without ensuring orderly distributidn or effective rationing of
the scarce commodities The extent
to wtridr this "potential" is exploiexactly

secrecy and are rarely caught The
few recorded cases of hoarding

(see table 4 show the existene of
hoarded commodities wtrich feed

the black market-

coNcLt sroN

The foregoing analysis

has

strown that price control in Nigeria
is not vrrcrking smoot'rly. This fact

Firstly, a new body (whether
it is called Price lntelligence Agency
or any other suitable name) should
be given the poranr and hecessary
fund not only to study the price
structure and price movements an
the economy but also to study the
supply and demand Potentials in

the economy with a view to for'
casting the demand and suPPlY
position to be expected in the.
near future. This study and forcast will enable the new body to
order or advise the approPriate
quartes to make provision in
advance for the anticipated dpmand
or to initiate policy measures to
control demand if it as not possible

of many

to.increre supply. The new body
strould not only be able to give
information to and hold dialogue

questaons come to mind here.
Firstly can the Price Control Board,

with the chief organs that produce,
import and distribute the commodities consumed in the country but
also should have statutory power to

confirms the contention

economists that direst price regulation hardly works well. Two

with its

present strusture

and

poucrs uork better than it is doing
now? Secondly can the Price lntelligence Agency replace the Price
Control Board as an organ that is
supposed to moderate the price
level in the country? lf the Price
Control Board, in its current form,
employs more research experts and

price inspectors for price fixing
and price enforcement it will still
discover that the existence of
scarcity in the eoonomy will continue to "dis-arm" the price enforcemerlt agents no matter how much

equipped they are. Besides, the
imperfections'of the market will
ensure that producen and distributors (wtro are mainly oligopolists
and monopolistic competitors) win
any struggle to curtail their profit
The ernergence of the Price lntel-

ligence Agency has not even impro-

ved the situation. The Agency is
affiliated to the Price' Control
Board

to study

and interpret price

structure and price movements in

the

eoonomy

on a

continuing

basis. Apart from the inadequacy of
the manporrtcr of the Agency, its
effofts are wrongly directed to
helping in determining the level at
which to control prices wtrich have
been found to be unvrrorkable.
Therefore, in its current form, the

Agency cannot succesfully rcplace

the Board (if succes is

measured

issue orders to them when necessary. With the aid of this forcast
the govemment can formulate its
fiscal and monetary policies, with
respeet to demand and supply

situation, in sudr a way as not to
jeopardise its efforts to promoE
price stabilitv.

Secondly, we should realise
that our low production base, as
well as the imperfections of the

market strueture (like the existence
producers for a

of few firms or

commodity, difficulty of entry into
and exit from our industries, collusion among firms, etc.), are the
chief faston trat make it diffictlt

for supply to cope with demand in

the economy. Therefore, the task
of moderating prices through

demand and supply forcast should
be supplemented with existing and

new

measures

to

increase' our

agricultural and industrial output

and also with re-structuring the
market for commodities. This re
strusturing should be geared to
reducing the imperfections of the
market by preventing collusion
among firms, removing unnecessary

of entry into some
businesses, and discouraging
too many levels of middlemen
between the producer and the
restrictions

consumer.

by the ability to keep prices reasonably low).
A new body which is envisaged
to aid the rirork of keeping prices
reasonably low should not seek to
control a set of prices but should

in close cooperation with those
who control the.chief determinants
of price {suppty and demand, and
in some cases have a meaure of
control over some of them. With
this bdckground in mind,the following suggestions

are

made for the

'future price control in this country.
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